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Abstract The EU funded SIMDAT project is aimed at
applying generic grid technology for the solution of
complex application problems in several representative
fields including automotive, aerospace, pharmaceutical
and meteorology. To satisfy the requirements of the World
Meteorological Organization (WMO) and the WMO Infor-
mation Systems (WIS), the partners in the meteorology
activity within SIMDAT (ECMWF, Deutscher Wetterdienst,
the UK Met office, EUMETSAT and Météo-France), have
developed grid-enabled software that provides generic
distributed access to distributed meteorological data repos-
itories via web-based portals, through a series of nodes
organized in a mesh network. However, granting access to
such an infrastructure, especially considering its fully
distributed nature, is a serious challenge and a risk to the
security of the overall grid infrastructure. SIMDAT solves
this problem by implementing a security model based on a
decentralized fine-grained access control mechanism that
federates data providers and security issues using the notion
of “trust domains”. In this paper we highlight the main
features of the SIMDAT grid application and describe its
security model in detail.
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Introduction
Data distribution and exchange are at the centre of core
meteorological activities. Observation data is continually
collected from distributed sources, fed into numerical
weather prediction systems and re-distributed in raw format
as well as in the form of prediction model outputs to
forecast offices, service providers and end users. Collected
observations of present validity are considered “real-time
data” and are exchanged globally through dedicated net-
works to ensure that meteorological centres can feed these
into forecasting models. Once the forecast is produced by
the model, observations are stored into archives to ensure
its preservation for post-analysis studies.
In the same manner, the forecast produced, of a present
validity, represents real-time data usually available from on-
line disks and it goes into archived mode once it passes its
validity time. Data policies concerning a product change over
its lifetime depending on whether this product represents its
real-time status or the archived one. These policies might need
to protect data of commercial value. Therefore, sharing of
these datasets becomes a very delicate activity that needs to be
carried out in a very controlled environment.
Other WMO designated centres and related programs,
are also data producers wishing to publish and share the
results of their studies and projects and ensure the long term
preservation and accessibility to its data. In this vein, the
forthcoming WMO Information System is a long term
infrastructure initiative to ensure coordinated access and
sharing of the data.
At present, there are well defined global policies
recognised by the WMO data centres e.g. WMO Resolution
40, which relates to the provision of free and unrestricted
exchange of data and products between WMO members
and related programs. Although these data policies are well
established and recognised by the different data centres,
there is still a lack of infrastructure that allows sharing of
data and policies in order to facilitate access to a user
requesting data from multiple data centres. Research studies
involving cross-boundary geo spatial locations result in
multiple requests from a user who has to contact several
meteorological centres and register at several institutes.
Users would benefit considerably from a shared infrastruc-
ture that would allow them to retrieve data from any data
centre without having to acknowledge many different
policies and register at many different places in order to
retrieve data from distributed locations.
Equally, data centres would benefit from an infrastruc-
ture that would allow them to publish and share datasets in
a secured and well controlled environment that makes data
available to end users and other data centres under
dedicated agreements.
In order to support such activities, the meteorology
activity of the SIMDAT project developed and deployed a
virtual meteorological centre (VMC)—a common system
with the aim of collecting and sharing distributed meteoro-
logical data (SIMDAT 2004b).
By using a grid infrastructure, the VMC provides the
meteorological community with a single view of highly
heterogeneous data kept in a variety of administrative and
technological domains, systems and formats.
Virtual organisations
Resource federation leads to the virtualisation of all grid
members into virtual organizations (VOs), where neither
users nor resources are part of single organizations (Ahsant
et al. 2006). VOs have been used as a bridge to establish
trust relationships between the entity members (users,
organizations, etc) and resource providers (RP) of a grid
infrastructure. Thus, all entity members commit their
resources to the VO and explicitly adhere to the common
set of policies used to establish it (Foster et al. 2001). In
return, VO members expect a trustworthy grid security
model (Welch et al. 2003; Welch et al. 2005) that under-
stands local security infrastructures, protects RPs assets and
maintains user privacy but without limiting the VO’s
scalability and flexibility.
Consequently, research efforts within the grid community
in recent years have focused on developing protocols, services
and tools that help to build scalable VOs (Foster et al. 2001).
In aiming to fulfil this vision, one of the most significant
challenges for the grid computing community has been to
develop a comprehensive group of mechanisms and policies
for securing the grid (Welch et al. 2003; Humphrey et al.
2005; Ahsant et al. 2006). In short, any grid security model
should be scalable, integrateable, interoperable, trusted and
enforced. The need to support the integration and manage-
ment of resources within the VOs has introduced complexity,
challenging basic security issues (Welch et al. 2003).
In order to understand the different grid security
architectures and technologies that have been developed,
it is convenient to introduce a number of key concepts
(Foster et al. 2001; Humphrey et al. 2005; IJISC 2006):
& Authentication: the process of verifying the identity of
the user requesting access to a resource available at the
VO.
& Credentials: the generic term to describe information
provided by the user in order to be authenticated.
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& X.509 certificates: electronic credentials used to identify
a user, RP or organization that bind the identity’s
Distinguished Name (DN) with a public key.
& Authorization: the process of determining whether
access to a resource should be granted to a certain user
based on the policies written by the VO.
& Privacy: the enforcement of security policies to safe-
guard critical user information.
Authentication and authorization
Within a grid, the ability to perform remote work or requests is
an essential task that requires the secure authentication and
authorization of users (Snelling et al. 2004). During the early
stages, grid security mechanisms were based only on the
identities of the interacting entities (Foster et al. 2001;
Sinnott et al. 2006b). A very common authentication method
to establish a user identity within a grid is by using a Public
Key Infrastructure (PKI), based on certificates issued by a
trusted Certification Authority (CA). In the PKI model,
entities are authenticated by presenting as credentials an
X.509 digital certificate, which contains a unique Distin-
guished Name (DN) and a public key. The matching private
key is kept securely by the entity. Authorization to access a
specific resource is performed by using a locally managed
Access Control List (ACL) of authorized users or grid-
mapfile. As the grid-mapfile only allows the mapping users’
DNs to local user names at resource level, it lacks the ability
to grant fine grained access control to the resources, thus
compromising the security of the providers (Sinnott et al.
2006a). Moreover, any access control relying only on the
local listing names of authorized users is not scalable to the
proportions needed for a VO that may grow dynamically
(Sinnott et al. 2006a, b). Nevertheless, the PKI model has
had widespread acceptance in the grid community.
Advanced security infrastructures
As grid applications move from scientific communities to
more secured, focused areas, such as the health and
industry sectors, this authentication-only security model is
not only inapplicable but also hinders the VO scalability
(Welch at al. 2003). Recently, considerable progress has
been made in developing advanced security infrastructures
that integrate authentication and authorization processes
into the grid middleware (Foster et al. 2001; Demchenko et
al. 2006; Sinnott et al. 2006b). Notable examples are the
development of the Globus Toolkit1 and the Unicore2
middleware to enable grids making high performance
computers available to scientific communities (Welch et
al. 2003). In the Globus Toolkit, the Grid Security
Infrastructure (GSI) module defines a unique credential
set based on X.509 certificates issued by a trust CA, and a
common protocol based on the transport layer security
(TLS). The GSI credential set coupled with an associated
private key is used by any grid entity to authenticate itself
to other grid entities (Humphrey et al. 2005). As grids
outside the research community can grow into thousands
very quickly, this centralized model of certification based
on CA goes against the VO principles of flexibility and
scalability. Hence, the Globus Toolkit introduced the X.509
proxy certificates that allow a user (without CA participa-
tion) to assign dynamically a new X.509 identity to an
entity and also delegate some subset of his/her rights to the
receiver (Welch et al. 2003; Snelling et al. 2004). To
manage a more fine-grained VO membership, the 3.2
Globus version introduced a VO-like Community Authen-
tication Server (CAS) that issues certificates with access
restrictions based on agreements between the VO and the
resource owner (Pearlman et al. 2003). CAS coupled with
proxy certificates is the attempt is the GSI’s attempt to
dynamically create and manage simple trust domains.
Another effort has been made by the EU DataGrid
(EDG) test bed (Cornwall et al. 2003), in which the
authorization process for each resource is managed by an
automated procedure that derives local policies from
central, manually managed source(s) of authorization
(Alfieri et al. 2005). Neither the CAS nor EDG models
are a scalable solution to potentially large grids. The EDG
security model has been replaced by the Virtual Organisa-
tion Management Systems (VOMS), an authorization
service that classifies VO users based on a set of attributes
(Alfieri et al. 2004). VOMS differs from CAS and EDG, as
it does not centralize all policy information (group
membership and relevant rights) in a server (Alfieri et al.
2005). Instead, VOMS separates information about group
memberships—stored in a server—from the information
about granted rights stored and mapped at resource level
(Alfieri et al. 2005). However, keeping a central VO user
database places a large burden on each VO administrator as
all grid users need to be added (Sinnott et al. 2006b). As a
VO may expand rapidly and memberships change dynam-
ically, the VOMS solution becomes impractical to admin-
ister (Welch et al. 2005).
The next generation of grids proposed the idea of
federation for grouping users with similar properties or
roles, in order to factor the users × machines problem into
manageable parts (Chivers 2003). The meteorological
activity can be seen as an example of federation, as it
aims at grouping users wishing to access meteorological
resources. As a federation is also able to group resources,
1 Information on Globus Toolkit available at http://www.globus.org/
toolkit/
2 Information on Unicore Middleware available at http://www.unicore.
eu/unicore/
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it could be used as the foundation of a management
system to control access to similarly federated resources
(JISC 2006). Moreover, by using a federation the number
of bipartite agreements between RPs and users can be
minimized as all members of a federation sign up to an
agreed set of policies (Chivers 2003) rather than having to
establish bilateral agreements among all participant enti-
ties (Alfieri et al. 2004).
Fine-grained access control
Moving forward, the Shibboleth system proposed factoring
grid security requirements into manageable domains using
federation (Morgan et al. 2004). With Shibboleth, local
organisations, known as Identity Providers (IdPs), are
responsible for authenticating the user (by checking his/
her credentials) and proving user’s attribute information
(JISC 2006). The decision to authorize access to a resource
is made by the resource owner or Service Provider (SP),
based on the user’s attribute information (attributed-based
authorization). Though deployed separately, the SP and IdP
are used by Shibboleth to provide secure access to web-
based resources (Morgan et al. 2004). Shibboleth is an
implementation of the Security Assertion Mark-Up Lan-
guage (SAML), which provides interoperability among web
sign-on products. Furthermore, the GridShib project (Welch
et al. 2005) is an attempt to provide a mechanism whereby
a grid service authenticates a user using the Globus GSI,
and authorization is performed by using user attributes from
the Shibboleth IdP.
With the emergence of grid services, some research has
focused on grid scalability issues, and on implementing
federated security services and policy-based access control
systems (Ahsant et al. 2006; Demchenko et al. 2006; Lang
et al. 2006; Sinnott et al. 2006b). Advance authorization
services aiming at fine grained access control are based on
users sharing similar roles (Demchenko et al. 2006), for
instance membership of the same project, all researchers at
ECMWF, etc. As Sinnott et al. 2006a state attribute based-
authorization is scalable to global proportions and when it
is coupled to a policy based authorization system, allows
fine-grained access control to local resources. One of the
challenges of the SIMDAT architecture is, therefore, to
embrace multi-organization federations, allowing scalable
growth of the distributed infrastructure. Additionally, the
SIMDAT’s VMC security architecture needs control mech-
anisms to protect users’ privacy, in order to comply with
local legal security requirements.
VO in the SIMDAT meteorological activity
In this paper we outline a novel framework that organizes
secure access to distributed users and datasets that are part of a
dynamic VO. In doing so, SIMDAT introduces the concept of
domain, in order to federate resources from the participant
members of the VO. The proposed security framework
implements an attribute based access control model, where
authentication and authorization are two separate processes
that depend on the trust relations established in each trust
domain. The framework is explored in the context of a
distributed, scalable, flexible and loosely coupled grid
architecture that expects the provision of a unified but highly
secured view of meteorological data. The proposed approach
and solution have been developed to respond both to general
security issues regarding grid infrastructures and to the
specific requirements of the meteorological community.
Nevertheless, many other communities aiming to share
resources using a grid data structure may benefit not only
from the experience but also from the technological solution
developed.
The Virtual Meteorological Centre (VMC)
The VMC is an innovative, decentralised framework deploy-
ing a grid infrastructure that offers cataloguing, discovery and
data retrieval facilities to the meteorological community.
Moreover, to overcome the multiple security challenges in
any grid environment (Chivers 2003; Welch et al. 2003;
Humphrey et al. 2005; Sinnott et al. 2006a) VMC
incorporates a novel security model that protects users’
privacy and data resources, but without hindering the basic
grid principles. The VMC platform is the result of a joint
effort by the meteorological centres of Germany (Deutscher
Wetterdienst), France (Météo-France) and the United King-
dom (UK MetOffice) and two European organisations:
ECMWF (European Centre for Medium-range Weather
Forecasts) and EUMETSAT (European Organisation for the
Exploitation of Meteorological Satellites).
A three tier component stack
VMC integrates a stack of three self-contained and loosely
coupled components: the portal, the catalogue node (CN)
and the data repository (DR). The VMC architecture, as
shown in Fig. 1, is assembled by interconnecting a series of
nodes through a dedicated, secure communication layer.
Through a web-based portal (pink component in Fig. 1),
each node is able to provide distributed access to data held
in legacy systems bridged by the DR interface (green panel
in Fig. 1).
The VMC solution offers a decentralized virtual cata-
logue made up of standard metadata records describing the
resources held by each of the meteorological centres or
RPs. The heterogeneous resources owned by diverse data
publishing centres are thus federated into a single view or
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virtual catalogue made available via the VMC infrastruc-
ture. Consequently, the VMC architecture provides the right
support for building a distributed network not only of
meteorological centres but of any group of providers
interested in offering data and resources to a wider
community.
As the Fig. 1 illustrates, the portal provides the VMC
with a flexible and user-friendly, web-based interface to
discover, request, subscribe to or download data resources
from the virtual catalogue. The portal’s implementation
exploits metadata- and ontology-based technologies to
provide users with a more intelligent searching and
browsing service over the virtual catalogue. The discovery
services incorporates a scoring system that creates indexes
from relevant metadata fields, such as title, abstract,
keywords, temporal and geographical coordinates, etc. In
addition, by incorporating earth science ontologies such as
GMET and SWEET (Pouchard et al. 2003), the portal
provides users with a controlled navigation tool, based on
the taxonomical relations between meteorological terms,
thus increasing the probability of a more successful, rapid
and efficient data discovery.
To offer a comprehensive discovery service at the portal,
the VMC architecture required a component that main-
tained the virtual catalogue. Consequently, the CN was
designed to provide connectivity amongst RPs and to
communicate with local data sources via the DR(s). The
VMC solution implemented a synchronization engine, run
by the CNs, that ensured every node had a copy of the
global metadata catalogue, and provided users with fast
responses when searching for datasets.
A noteworthy feature of VMC is that it offers a non-
instructive infrastructure that is easily adaptable to the
existing legacy systems held by different data providers
(meteorological services). To achieve this, the VMC has
been provided with the DR, a unified interface that bridges
the CN to any existing data distribution system. The DR
provides the facilities to translate on demand data subscrip-
tion requests into requests that the interfaced data source
understands. The DR also acts as a metadata provider by
describing any accessible dataset according to the
ISO19115 standard.
The infrastructure architecture
One of the main limitations of an early VMC prototype was
the fully connected nature of the grid architecture. This
implied that each node had to be connected to every other
node, in order to get a full copy of the catalogue or retrieve
datasets from any site. As the number of participating nodes
gradually grew, the fully connected architecture proved
neither scalable nor manageable. Then, the VMC was
improved by implementing a fully decentralized architec-
ture, following a peer-to-peer model (Iamnitchi et al. 2002).
Fig. 1 Three tier VMC architecture
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The solution jointly developed with INTEL, consisted of
adopting algorithms and technology used in the mobile
telephony world to build a mesh network. Within a mesh
network, each peer is connected to a small number of peers
and dedicated routing algorithms were incorporated to
determine the fastest route to a particular peer destination.
Two implementations of the routing service have been
integrated: a static map routing which, based on a static
map available at each peer, calculates “peer-to-peer routes”
following the Dijkstra Shortest Path Algorithm (Dijkstra
1959); and a more dynamic approach, implemented by
using the Ad-hoc On-demand Distance Vector—AODV
Algorithm (Perkins and Royer 1999), which establishes a
route to a destination only on demand, hence reducing the
network traffic. The router service has the capability to
forward requests using a chain of intermediate peers within
the mesh network. As the VMC architecture is fully
decentralised, there is not a central point of failure.
Moreover, partners can be added to and removed from the
grid, without having a major impact on the network
connectivity.
Securing the VMC infrastructure
From an administrative viewpoint, the VMC was estab-
lished as a set of organizations, people and resources with
the common goal of offering integrated meteorological data
and value-added services (SIMDAT 2004a). Thus, the
partners in the SIMDAT meteorological activity agreed on
establishing a VO within the context of the meteorological
domain, to develop and implement an operational frame-
work to manage the VMC and to establish mechanisms and
policies for securing the grid.
Security challenges within the VMC infrastructure
As the mesh network did indeed prove to be a scalable and
flexible decentralized architectural solution for the VMC,
the authorization and authentication process within the
security model needed to match the peer-to-peer environ-
ment, without introducing any single point of failure.
Within the VO context, each VMC partner maintains its
own user registration and implements its own policies for
accessing resources. Thus, as the DR provides a non-
intrusive way to bridge any legacy systems, so the security
model needed to deliver an authorization mechanism that
allowed each resource provider (DRs owners) to retain
ultimate control over the policies that govern access to its
resources (Pearlman et al. 2003). The security solution
therefore requires that users are authenticated at one site
(the portal) and authorised at another (the DR), without
exchanging user information. This requirement for user
privacy is dictated by national laws such as the “Data
Protection Act 1998”3 in the UK and by the “Loi
informatique et libertés”4 in France.
The VMC-VO trust model
Trust management, as Humphrey et al. 2005 defined, is the
process of deciding what entities are to be trusted to do
what actions. Hence, the VMC-VO adopted the concept of
trust relationships amongst the participating entities as the
building block of its security architecture. All the entities
involved in such an agreement formed a domain of trust or
domain for short.
A domain is defined as a group of organizations that
share a common set of roles and data access policies. All
members of the domain must have the same understanding
of each of the roles and data policies that they share. This is
achieved by “out-of-bound” agreements, that can take the
form of a contract (e.g. between members of a project), a
convention (e.g. between ECMWF and its members) or a
resolution (e.g. amongst all Member States of the WMO),
etc. Once this has been established, all members of a given
domain trust each other for allocating roles and authorizing
users to access any data that they make available on the
grid.
Within the VMC-VO, an organisation can be part of
several domains, thus sharing different datasets with
different partners, while still being part of the same
infrastructure. An example of such domains could be all
national meteorological services represented at the WMO,
which all agree on a common data policy defining what
data are freely available for research and education. Having
established a common understanding of the definition of
“research”, one meteorological service would deliver the
agreed data to a user, if another meteorological service had
claimed that this user was a researcher.
Implementation
Within the VMC, a domain delimits the scope of the data
polices of the organizations that belong to the VO.
Consequently, a domain defines a group of sites with a
common data access policy. The domain’s member entities
have to define the data access policies visible to that
domain only. These policies are expressed in terms of
roles. Roles and data policies are interchangeable terms,
e.g. the role researcher and the data policy researcher
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In order to establish a domain, all members exchange
their public keys, which will later be used to check the
authenticity of the sites’ signature attached to any request.
Within a domain, users may have several roles and a
dataset may have several associated data policies. Thus
to access a given dataset, a user must have at least one
role that matches at least one data policy of that dataset.
In the figure above, B publishes a dataset with the
domain1. researcher data policy and a user at A has been
assigned to the domain1. researcher role. As the role and
data policy match and A and B belong to the same
domain domain1, the user at A is granted access to the
relevant dataset at B.
By mapping role × data policies, the VMC-VO security
architecture was able to factor the users × machine problem
(Chivers 2003) into manageable parts. Instead of having to
establish n × n number5 of bi-lateral agreements amongst
all the entities within the domain, a newly joining
organization has only to agree on the existing role × data
policies for that specific domain. This decision resulted
from the realisation that, in any distributed system
involving several organisations, there must be a formal
agreement that defines a common understanding of the
roles/data policies.
Implementing the trust domain-based security model
posed a series of design and technological challenges to the
SIMDAT developers. The VMC implementation supports
multiple domain membership, thus a site can belong to
many other domains. However, in order to successfully
manage the complexity and enable grid scalability and
growth, domains in the VO do not form a hierarchy but a
flat structure. The VMC avoids policy or role name clashes
amongst domains by implementing domain names as
“name spaces” for roles and data policies. Thus, the role
research in the domain1 domain differs from the role
research in the domain2.
Prior to establishing a domain, potential members must
agree on a list of roles/data policies for accessing the
resources federated by the domain. Domain authentication
is therefore managed by exchanging public keys between
the domain members, so each site holds a repository that
associates the domain with a list of public keys. Adding a
key to this repository is the responsibility of the site
administrator.
In order to publish data, the VMC allows that the
corresponding data policies (including one or more domain
name spaces) are attached to the dataset metadata. In this
way, users know, while browsing the catalogue at the
portal, whether their current credentials grant access to a
particular dataset. Moreover, one dataset can be published
with different data policies in different domains.
Putting it all together
Figure 3 provides an overview of the way the security
model has been implemented within the VMC three tier
architecture.
The Login Service allows a user to log-in at any home
site using the portal web-based interface. As illustrated in
Fig. 3, the user is authenticated at the first point of contact.
When a user requests a specific dataset from a remote
site (right hand side node), the user home site (left hand
side node) issues a request. The user roles are attached to
the request that is signed by the user home site using its
private key. The request is forwarded to the destination
node by a chain of intermediate nodes according to the
topology of the mesh network. Intermediate nodes may not
need to be in the same domain as the sender node to
forward the request.
The destination site receives the request and checks its
signature (sender site’s private key) against the list of
known domain members using the public keys previously
stored. If the request is signed by a known site, the roles
from all the domains that are common to sender and
receiver sites are extracted from the request. This list is
matched against the data policies of the requested dataset. If
any of the user’s roles matches any of the dataset policies,
access to the data is granted.
Scenario 1: Authentication and authorisation within a
domain
The following scenario illustrates a user login sequence,
using the access control model based on trust domains
proposed by the VMC (Fig. 4).
1. The B site publishes a dataset with the domain1.
researcher data policy.
2. A user is registered with the domain1.researcher user
role established within the domain1.
3. The user logs into A and is authenticated by proving
his/her identity (X.509 certificate, password and user-
name). The user wants to access a dataset in B.
Fig. 2 Mapping data policies with users’ roles
5 Where “n” is the total number of entities within the domain.
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4. A assembles a request using the domain1.researcher
user role and signs it using its private key. Then, A
sends the assembled request to B.
5. B checks the A signature against the known public
keys. It also checks if A is member of the domain1. As
both belong to the same domain, B trusts A. Finally, B
checks the role within the received request against the
data policy. If they are the same, B grants the user
access to the requested dataset.
Scenario 2: Handling requests from other domains
This scenario describes how the requests coming from
other domains are handled by the VMC (Fig. 5).
1. The B site publishes a dataset with the domain1.
researcher data policy.
2. A user is registered with the domain2.researcher user
role established within the domain2.
3. The user logs into D and is authenticated. The user wants
to access a dataset in B that belongs to the domain1.
4. D assembles a request using the domain2.researcher
user role and signs it using its private key. Then, D
sends the assembled request to B.
5. B checks the D signature against the known public
keys. As D is not a member of domain1, access to the
data is denied, without even considering the roles.
This scenario also demonstrates that, if a remote site
were to pretend that one of its users had a valid role from
the domain1, access to the data would still be denied, as the
request would not be signed by a trusted member of the
domain.
Scenario 3: Access through a different site
The third scenario shows that the proposed security
model will allow users to have access to the grid, even if
Fig. 4 Authorization and au-
thentication within the same
domain
Fig. 3 The proposed security model and the VMC architecture
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their home site is not available. This can be achieved
without the need for users to register at several sites or to
exchange any user specific information between the nodes
(Figs. 6 and 7).
1. The B site publishes a dataset with the domain1.
researcher data policy.
2. The user logs into A and is authenticated by proving
his/her identity (X.509 certificate, password and user-
name). The user wants to access a dataset in B.
3. A exports the user’s credentials (e.g. the user’s identity
and a list of roles) into a “wallet” and signs it using its
private key.
4. A suddenly becomes unavailable.
5. The user is able to login at C by using his “wallet”.
6. C accepts the user’s login because it has been signed by
A which belongs to the same domain. The user’s
authorization is performed by checking that the wallet
has been signed by a node from the same trust domain.
7. Now, the user can issue a data request to B. Before
sending it, C signs it with its private key and also
attaches the roles signed by A from the original request.
8. Finally, B checks that both A and C signatures come
from the same trusted domain. This is performed before
B checks the user’s role against the dataset data policy.
Results and further work
The VMC infrastructure has been installed and tested by
nine different meteorological centres all over the world (see
Fig. 8); it successfully provides 24/7 access to a virtual
catalogue comprising more than 27,000 datasets distributed
amongst all its partners.
The architecture has proved to be very flexible, as it allows
different deployments, which can adapt to the different
network topologies and security constraints of each of the
partners. The adapted mesh network topology provides a very
scalable infrastructure to the VMC, as a CN needs only to be
directly connected to a limited number of peers.
On top of this architecture, security modules following
the model described were implemented following standard
GRID and SOA technologies.
The authentication service is based on Web Services
technologies, making use of WS-Security between the
portal and CN interfaces.
The authorisation and trust services are built-in modules
within an XML based message SOA framework that
communicates the CN peers. Data requests carry Security
Assertion Markup Language (SAML) structures asserting
authenticated users’ requests, their roles within a domain
and domain membership for the issuing organisation.
SAML assertions allow users’ requests to reach a remote
node and request data without the need for authenticating
again, at the remote site. The trust established between data
centres allows for authenticated users to place requests
within the domain of trust.
PKI infrastructure and W3C XML Signature are used to
digitally sign the requests that travel to remote peers where
verification modules check for the integrity of the message
as well as the authenticity of the issuer. PKI is also used to
establish secured communication between the CN channels
to send messages encrypted.
Fig. 5 Handling requests from
other domains
Fig. 6 Redirecting authoriza-
tion when the user’s home site
is unavailable (part one)
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Data policies are expressed technically in terms of roles
and these are uniquely identified within a domain. The
domain qualified roles are described as part of the
metadata describing a dataset. These are checked against
the user’s roles when a data request and its SAML
assertion containing the role information arrives from a
remote site.
The software has achieved its maturity implementing
distributed access controlled to protected datasets in
trusted domains. On the other hand, the implementation
is still lacking from scenario number 3, described in the
previous section, in order to support end users wanting to
use any portal from a trusted domain as a back up
mechanism.
Finally, the establishment of trust and VO formation is
a manual process. The organisations interested in estab-
lishing a domain of trust, negotiate “out-of-band” the
policies and terms for accessing the VO as well as the
individual membership. Policies, domains and trusted
organisations are then catalogued and imported at each
of the individual members, of course this information is
not synchronised and stays at each of the data centres’
own catalogues. One of the drawbacks that arises from
this manual set up comes when domain or policy
information needs to be updated. Under these circum-
stances, the framework would benefit from a notification
mechanism and automatic ingestion of new or updated
policies at the trusted sites.
Fig. 8 VMC data grid
Fig. 7 Redirecting authoriza-
tion when the user’s home site
is unavailable (part two)
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Discussions and conclusions
Studies of existing security models outlined the limitations
of available grid middleware in handling fine-grained
access rights to distributed data in a way that protected
not only available resources, but also users’ privacy,
without hindering local sites’ autonomy (Chivers 2003;
Alfieri et al. 2005; Humphrey et al. 2005).
The securitymodel proposed in this paper not only allows a
fine-grained access control mechanism to the available
resources, but has also proved to be a scalable solution that
fulfils the requirements of the 24/7 distributed robust
architecture needed for sharing meteorological data. The
proposed security model has provided the VMC architecture
with authentication and authorization components that can be
easily interfaced within any existing security systems at the
organization or data providers involved.
The VMC provides data centres with a framework that
allows them to publish and share data in a secure
environment with minimal disruption to their existing
legacy systems. The establishment of trust domains allows
for the creation of well defined policies that pertain to data
defined only within the domain. Thus, adoption of the
framework either to enforce global policies e.g. such as
WMO Resolution 40, or to enforce policies at a smaller
scale domain would allow for automatic sharing of secured
and distributed datasets.
At the same time, end users can make use of a portal
facility that provides them with a single view catalogue of
data distributed in multiple data centres. Users can then
retrieve datasets from multiple locations without the need
for registering at every data centre from which they require
data. The VMC allows users distributed data retrieval in a
seamless and secure way without exposing the end user to
the complexities of a distributed platform.
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